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Introduction
The National People’s Congress (NPC) of China adopted the fifth batchof amendments to the 1982 Constitution (the Constitution) on 11March 2018, 14 years after the Constitution was last amended. (1) Un-
like all previous amendments, which attracted very positive comments, the
2018 amendments have generally been criticised by scholars and commen-
tators both in mainland China and overseas. (2) Among these amendments,
three important ones have received wide attention. The first is the incorpo-
ration of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into Article
1 of the Constitution as “the defining feature of socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics.” The second is the constitutional recognition of no term limits
for the “tripartite rule” of the Secretary-General of the CCP, the President
of State, and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC)
through the abolition of term limits on the President of State. The third is
the creation of a new constitutional organ called the supervisory commis-
sion to consolidate certain functions of the CCP’s Discipline and Inspection
Commissions (DICs), the people’s procuratorates, and the Ministry of Su-
pervision under the State Council. 
The main criticism of these amendments is that they represent a significant
setback to China’s constitutional development because term limits for senior
state officials, including the president, and separation of the CCP from the
state are regarded as major achievements of the 1982 Constitution. (3) The
first issue this article will examine is whether the three major amendments
are really as bad as widely perceived, by using contextual, historical, and em-
pirical analysis of how those issues have been dealt with by the Constitution,
and whether or not those constitutional amendments will have a significant
impact upon actual constitutional practice in China. The discussion will show
that leadership of the CCP has been consistently emphasised and practiced
in China, and that term limits have never been imposed on the Chairman of
the CMC, who is de facto the country’s most powerful person. This paper
therefore argues that the first two constitutional amendments are unlikely
to have any practical impact. However, the creation of the supervisory com-
missions means a new constitutional power has been created, which will
change not only the constitutional structure under the people’s congress
system but also the Party-state relationship under the Constitution.
As far as the Party-state relationship is concerned, various interpretative
frameworks have been proposed with the aim of developing a coherent
constitutional theory to justify China’s Party-state system. The political con-
stitutional theory and dual normative system theory are the most well-
known among them. The political constitutional theory argues that the CCP,
as the ruling political party in China, should not be subject to the constraints
of the written Constitution (Chen 2008; Jiang 2010; Jiang 2014). The dual
normative system theory argues in essence that there is a separation of po-
litical authority from administrative authority, of the CCP apparatus from
the state apparatus, and of the CCP normative system from the state nor-
mative system (Backer 2012; Li 2015). Whether the creation of the new
constitutional organ of supervisory commissions as the second fused organ
within both the CCP and state apparatus will affect the applicability of these
two theories is the second issue this paper will explore. The supervisory
commissions wear two hats and perform dual functions within both the
CCP and the state from the national to the local levels, and the 2018 reform
of the CCP and state organs has combined more CCP and state organs. (4)
They combine to challenge the persuasiveness of the two theories. 
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1. The 1982 Constitution was last amended in 2004.
2. Many constitutional scholars have criticised the amendments in WeChat groups, as they cannot
do so through official media or publications.
3. See Frank Ching, “China Charter Revision Shows HK Future Hangs by a Thread,” Hong Kong Eco-
nomic Journal, 5 April 2018, A13.
4. “深化党和国家机构改革方案” (Shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fang’an, Plan on deepening
the CCP and state institutional reform), Central Committee of the CCP press release, 21 March 2018,
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-03/21/content_5276191.htm#1 (accessed 29 January 2019). 
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Section I of this article first provides a review of the 2018 constitutional
amendments. While the abolition of term limits for the President of State
and the incorporation of the leadership of the CCP into Article 1 of the Con-
stitution have attracted wide media attention both in mainland China and
overseas, (5) many amendments are caused by and related to the creation
of a new constitutional supervisory organ, i.e., supervisory commissions at
various levels. Section II moves on to discuss the practical significance of
the constitutional amendments, especially the three mentioned above. Al-
though the first two amendments have attracted wide media attention as
well as strong criticism, this article argues that they do not really have much
practical constitutional significance because they will not result in any
change of current constitutional practice in China. They do, however, send
unpopular messages. The creation of the constitutional supervisory organ
brings a second merger of a CCP institution, i.e., the DIC, with two consti-
tutional organs and makes another CCP organ a constitutional one. It is a
constitutional endorsement of the CCP’s functions. This amendment will
not have any practical significance, either, because the DICs and supervisory
organs under the State Council already worked as one unit before the 2018
constitutional amendments. However, it is likely to have major implications
for both constitutional theory and the Party-state relationship in China. 
Section III examines the possible impact of the creation of the supervisory
commissions on two existing conceptual interpretative frameworks of Chi-
nese constitutional reality. With regard to both the political constitutional
theory and dual normative systems theory, this article will first discuss the
theories themselves and then how each may be challenged by the 2018
constitutional amendments. In particular, the discussion will focus on how
the applicability of the two theories is likely to be affected by the merger
of the CCP and state organs and the new constitutional power of supervi-
sion resulting from the creation of the supervisory commissions. The last
part of Section III will analyse whether a new theory is demanded by the
2018 constitutional amendments. 
The paper concludes by arguing that none of the three controversial con-
stitutional amendments will cause much practical change to constitutional
practice in China, although they do send out a very bad signal that life-long
presidency is returning. However, the creation of the constitutional organ
of supervisory commissions merges another CCP organ with state organs
and constitutionalises the functions originally performed by the DICs. This
is the constitutional amendment that is likely to cause significant change
to both the constitutional structure and its operation in China. This amend-
ment also raises new constitutional issues such as the nature of the super-
visory power, the relationship between supervisory commissions and other
state organs, and so on. In addition, the third constitutional amendment to-
gether with the Supervision Law and the trend of fusion in 2018 pose chal-
lenges to the two theories on Chinese constitutionalism. While
acknowledging the continuing applicability of political constitutional theory,
the author argues that the theory has fundamental limitations by blindly
endorsing any decisions taken by the CCP and should only be regarded as a
theory suitable for present-day China, which is still in transition from rule
by law to rule of law. With regard to the theory of a dual normative system,
dualism as its core has been challenged by the 2018 constitutional devel-
opments in China. It has become less persuasive in explaining Chinese con-
stitutional practice. The fact that China has moved closer to a
constitutionalised fused system challenges political constitutional theorists
in China to come up with a new theory that can better explain and/or jus-
tify new constitutional developments in China. Any new theory should serve
not only the purpose of justifying constitutional practice in China but also
the purpose of leading China towards at least a thin rule of law. 
The 2018 constitutional amendments and
their significance
The 2018 constitutional amendments
The NPC adopted 20 constitutional amendments to the 1982 Constitu-
tion on 11 March 2018. (6) This is the fifth time the 1982 Constitution has
been amended. (7) Unlike previous four times when the Constitution was
amended, there was little consultation this time either before or after the
CCP submitted its proposal for constitutional amendments to the NPC. (8)
Unlike the previous constitutional amendments, (9) the 2018 constitutional
amendments have attracted strong criticism from many scholars in main-
land China, who are of the view that the amendments are a serious setback
to China’s constitutional development. (10)
The decision to amend the Constitution was first made by the Standing
Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP
(Politburo) on 29 September 2017. (11) Thereafter consultation was carried
out within the CCP at a relatively high level. Consultation with non-CCP or-
ganisations didn’t happen until 15 December 2017. The draft amendments
were endorsed by the Central Committee of the CCP in its meeting on 18-
19 January 2018. The draft amendments were only made available to the
general public on 26 January 2018, when the CCP submitted to the Standing
Committee of the NPC (NPCSC) its recommendation to amend the Con-
stitution. The draft amendments were first discussed by the NPCSC at its
32nd meeting, held on 29-30 January 2018. Thereafter, the amendments
were adopted by the NPC on 11 March 2018. There were less than two
months from the time the draft amendments were made available to the
public to the time they were adopted by the NPC. (12) It was the quickest
amendment made to the 1982 Constitution, with little public consultation
and strong criticism from scholars. (13)
Among the 20 amendments, only the following relate to the rule of law and
may affect the Party-state relationship. The first is amendment 32, which has
changed “improve the socialist legal system” in paragraph 7 of the Preamble
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5. See Note 3 above.
6. They are numbered the 32nd to the 51st amendments to the 1982 Constitution.
7. After the current Constitution was enacted in 1982, it was amended four times in 1988, 1993,
1998, and 2004 before the 2018 Amendments.
8. I have been told by some senior academics in China that they were informed through telephone
calls by the relevant authorities not to comment on the draft constitutional amendment pro-
posal.
9. Chinese scholars mainly supported the first four constitutional amendments to the 1982 Consti-
tution.
10. In various electronic discussion forums, including Wechat groups, many Chinese scholars have ex-
pressed their concerns. But some scholars have said there is a policy prohibiting public discussion
of the 2018 Constitutional amendments in mainland China. There are some articles that indirectly
criticise the 2018 Constitutional Amendments. See for example, Gong Renren 龚刃韧, “梁漱溟与
孙冶方：中国宪法史上值得书写的两位人物” (Liang Shuming yu Sun Yefang: Zhongguo xianfa
shi shang zhide shuxie de liang wei renwu, Liang Shuming and Sun Yefang: Two noteworthy char-
acters in Chinese constitutional history), FT zhongwen wang (FT 中文网), 7 February 2018,
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001076252 (accessed 30 January 2019).
11. See Explanation made by Mr. Wang Chen on Constitutional Amendments (draft), “王晨作宪法修
正案 (草案) 的说明” (Wang Chen zuo xianfa xiuzheng’an (cao’an) de shuoming, Wang Chen mak-
ing explanations on the constitutional amendments (draft)), Fenghuang wang caijing
凤凰网财经, 7 March 2018, http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20180307/16014115_0.shtml (accessed




to “improve the socialist rule of law.” (14) The second is the addition of a new
sentence to the end of the existing paragraph 2 of Article 1, which reads “[t]he
leadership of the CCP is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese charac-
teristics.” (15) The third is that a new constitutional organ called supervisory
commission has been created through several amendments. (16) Supervisory
commissions have been defined as the supervisory organs of the state. (17)They
are established at the national level as well as a various local levels. (18)The Na-
tional Supervisory Commission (NSC) is the highest supervisory organ and di-
rects the work of the supervisory commissions at various local levels. (19) The
NSC is accountable to the NPC and NPCSC. Supervisory commissions at the
local levels are accountable to the organs of state power (the People’s con-
gresses) creating them and to the supervisory commissions at the immediately
higher level. (20) Supervisory commissions exercise supervisory power indepen-
dently according to the law, free from interference by any administrative organ,
public organisation, or individual. They shall, in handling duty-related violations
of law or crimes, cooperate with judicial organs, procuratorial organs, and law
enforcement organs, with mutual checks and balances. (21) The fourth is that
paragraph 3 of Article 79 of the Constitution has been amended to read “both
the President and the Vice-President of the PRC have a term of office the same
as the term of the NPC.” The two-term limit on the President of State has
been removed from the original paragraph 3.
Out of the four major amendments relating to rule of law and the Party-
state relationship, incorporating the CCP’s leadership into Article 1 of the
Constitution and the abolition of term limits on the President of State have
attracted wide attention and criticism. There are altogether nine amend-
ments relating to the creation of the new constitutional supervisory
organ. (22) That is understandable, because once a new constitutional organ
is established, its relationship with all existing constitutional organs needs
to be defined in the Constitution. As a result, the relevant Articles of the
Constitution need to be amended accordingly.
The importance of the 2018 constitutional
amendments 
Inclusion of the leadership of the CCP in Article 1 of the
Constitution
One of the four cardinal principles incorporated into the Preamble of the
1982 Constitution is the insistence on the leadership of the CCP. (23) The CCP
has always insisted on its leadership ever since it came to power in 1949. (24)
Its ruling style has, however, transformed over the years from that of a rev-
olutionary party to a ruling party (Zhao 2010a: 430). One commentator
has noted two specific transformations. First, the CCP has abandoned “the
mass mobilisation and social transformation goals in favor of political sta-
bility and economic development” (ibid.: 430). Second, the CCP has changed
from a vanguard into a more inclusive political party (ibid.). President Jiang
Zemin’s theory of “three represents” (san ge daibiao 三个代表), (25) regarded
as one major effort in this direction, was incorporated into the Preamble of
the Constitution in 2004. (26) The key theme of the theory is that the CCP
represents not only workers but also “the development of advanced pro-
ductive forces, the orientation of advanced culture, and the fundamental
interests of the broadest masses” (ibid.: 430). One Western reporter inter-
prets the theory of “three represents” to mean that the CCP “can be all
things to all people, promoting the interests not just of workers and farmers
but of wealthy entrepreneurs as well.” (27) The primary objective of the sec-
ond transformation is considered a rebranding of the CCP to make it “more
inclusive and less intrusive” (ibid.: 430).
Different views exist with regard to the normative effect of the incorpo-
ration of the leadership of the CCP into the Preamble. That’s also the reason
why different views exist on the importance of incorporation of the lead-
ership of the CCP into Article 1 of the Constitution this time. From the per-
spective of comparative constitutional law, it has been noted that there are
three kinds of preambles, including a ceremonial preamble, an interpretive
preamble, and a substantive preamble (Orgad 2010: 722 note 52). If the
Preamble to the Constitution is regarded as merely a ceremonial preamble,
the insistence on the leadership of the CCP as contained in the Preamble
would be of merely ceremonial value and wouldn’t have any normative ef-
fect in practice. The incorporation of the leadership of the CCP into Article
1 in the 2018 constitutional amendments is therefore important because
specific articles of the Constitution are binding. This view is, however, not
shared by many constitutional scholars in China.
The prevailing view among Chinese scholars, especially constitutional
scholars, is that the Preamble to the Constitution has the same legal effect
as the articles of the Constitution (Yin and Li 2004; Chen 2008). Since the
leadership of the CCP is already there in the Preamble, it won’t make any
difference including it again in Article 1 of the Constitution. Another point
worthy of note is that the new constitutional amendment states expressly
that the leadership of the CCP is a defining feature of socialism with Chinese
characteristics. It means the leadership of the CCP has now become an es-
sential component of socialism as defined and implemented in China.
In practice, the CCP has always been the ruling political party and has ex-
ercised its leadership role since coming to power in 1949. (28) Since the stu-
dent movement at Tiananmen Square in 1989, the leadership of the CCP has
been strengthened. At the national level, following his predecessors Jiang
Zemin and Hu Jintao, the current Secretary-General of the Central Commit-
tee of the CCP, Xi Jinping, currently holds the positions of President of State
and Chairman of the CMC. He is the most powerful person in China. This tri-
partite rule has been followed for more than two decades. (29) At a local level,
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14. See 2018 Constitutional Amendments.
15. This is amendment 36 of the 5th Constitutional Amendments.
16. They include amendments 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 50, and 52 of the 5th Constitutional Amend-
ments.
17. See Article 123 of 1982 Constitution (with 2018 Amendments).
18. See Article 124 of 1982 Constitution (with 2018 Amendments).
19. See Article 125 of 1982 Constitution (with 2018 Amendments).
20. See Article 126 of 1982 Constitution (with 2018 Amendments).
21. See Article 127 of 1982 Constitution (with 2018 Amendments).
22. They include amendments 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 50, and 52 in the 5th Constitutional Amend-
ments.
23. See the Preamble of the 1982 Constitution.
24. See preambles to all four Constitutions of the PRC.
25. It means: the CCP has always represented the most advanced productivity and culture in China,
as well as the most fundamental interests of the majority of the Chinese people. 
26. It was added to para. 7 of the Preamble by the 2004 Constitutional Amendments.
27. Elisabeth Rosenthal, “China’s Communists Try to Decide What they Stand for,” The New York Times,
1 May 2002.
28. Some scholars have argued that the leadership of the CCP was insisted on and practiced well be-
fore the CCP took over governance in mainland China in 1949. See Jiang Shigong (2010).
29. After Mao, tripartite rule started again in November 1989 when Deng Xiaoping gave up chair-
manship of the Central Military Commission and passed it to Jiang Zemin (that was five months
after Jiang was elected Secretary General of the CCP). When Jiang stepped down from the position
of President of State in March 2003, he didn’t pass the chairmanship immediately to Hu Jintao.
Instead, he kept that position until September 2004.
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the party secretary of the CCP organisation at each level of the people’s gov-
ernment is already the number one person among all governmental officials
at the same level, be it at the provincial, municipal, district/country, or town-
ship level. (30) Hence, it is unlikely that incorporating the leadership of the
CCP into Article 1 of the Constitution will make any practical difference at
all. Accordingly, it will not be of any constitutional significance. 
Abolition of term limits for the President of State
The rumour that the two-term limit for the President of State would be
scrapped had circulated for quite some time before the official release of
the draft constitutional amendments. (31) When the proposal was out, it
sparked fears of a dangerous return to one-man rule. (32) In introducing the
draft constitutional amendments to the NPC, Wang Chen, the deputy chief
of the NPC, said that the draft amendments to remove term limits won
unanimous support among all the people involved in the consultation pro-
cess. (33) Many commentators nevertheless have reservations about this. (34)
A constitutionally mandated two-term limit for senior state officials such
as the Premier and President of State was introduced by the 1982 Consti-
tution based on Deng Xiaoping’s idea. (35) The intention was to break through
one-man rule. It has been argued that it was a mechanism to institutionalise
China’s leadership system in the 1980s, to address the lack of effective in-
stitutions, and to create checks on the arbitrary authority of the Mao years
(Zhao 2010b: 425). 
Many scholars and commentators are of the view that abolishing the
term limit for the President of State is a drawback and a means for
President Xi to stay in power forever. That may lead to over-concen-
tration of power in one person. For example, one commentator in Hong
Kong has observed that it is “a dramatic rollback of one of Deng Xiaop-
ing’s major political reforms in the 1980s, in the wake of the death of
Chairman Mao Zedong, whose one-man, 27-year rule had exacted a
huge toll on China.” (36) There were even warnings that the imperial sys-
tem was being re-instated and that another Cultural Revolution was
imminent. (37)
The opposite view is that abolition of the term limit on the President of
State should be supported. The former head of the Central Policy Unit of
the Hong Kong Government, Mr. Shiu Sin Por, has provided a few justifica-
tions. First, the move is clearly intended to bring the three posts, i.e., the
President of State, Chairman of the CMC, and Secretary-General of the Cen-
tral Committee of the CCP, under a consistent arrangement. (38) Neither the
Secretary-General of the CCP nor the Chairman of the CMC is subject to
term limits. Second, under Xi’s leadership in his first five years as President
of State, China has undergone a great purge of corrupt officials, which has
seriously destabilised the system and provides a new beginning for China’s
march towards clean and effective government. Given that the anti-cor-
ruption campaign is only in its first stage, Xi’s leadership will ensure that
the anti-corruption campaign will continue to its second stage of “not being
able to be corrupt” and the third stage of “not wanting to be corrupt.” (39)
Third, “the next 10-15 years are crucial for China’s development. Its political
system is still young and evolving, and also faces complex internal as well
as external challenges. China must build a system that is both effective and
enduring. Abolition of the term limit of the President of State will contribute
to a strong governing body and is consistent with China’s needs.” (40)
The legal issue is whether abolition of the term limit will have either the-
oretical or practical importance to China’s constitutional design and prac-
tice. Theoretically, many presidential systems, such as the US and South
Korea, have term limits for their Presidents. (41) But in countries adopting a
parliamentary system such as the United Kingdom or Germany, there is no
statutory term limit for a Prime Minister/Chancellor. It all depends on
whether or not the Prime Minister/Chancellor can win the confidence of
his political party and Parliament. (42) The essence is whether there is a well-
established system to ensure that the head of state actually has the confi-
dence and support of the majority of people in that country. If the answer
is yes, there are no strong theoretical justifications to limit his term. In the
case of China, the bad experience with long-term one-man rule by Mao Ze-
dong has convinced many people that it is necessary to have a term limit
for the President of State.
Practically, the answer depends on whether President Xi’s actual power
to control will be affected if he no longer holds the position of President of
State after his second term. According to the late Professor Xiao Weiyun,
who was involved in drafting the 1982 Constitution, they drafted a longer
chapter on the CMC under the 1982 Constitution. Their draft was submitted
to Deng Xiaoping for comments. Deng deleted the other articles, and only
two articles were kept. This has been confirmed by Wang Hanbin, the former
vice chairman of the NPCSC. (43) There is no term limit on the Chairman of
the CMC, which may represent Deng’s intention. (44) Deng was the actual
top leader in China because he held that position. After Deng, Jiang Zemin
was still the de facto number one person after finishing his two terms as
President of State because he continued to hold the position of Chairman
of the CMC. (45) Following the precedents of Deng and Jiang, one persuasive
argument is that whoever holds the position of Chairman of the CMC will
be the de facto number one leader in China. Hence, so long as Xi holds onto
the position of Chairman of the CMC, he will continue to have actual control
in China even without the position of President of State. Another justifica-
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30. The Chinese Central Government raised this requirement in 1992. See Wu Zhantuan 吴展团, “党
委书记兼任人大主任有利于地方发展” (Dangwei shuji jianren renda zhuren youli yu difang
fazhan, It is beneficial to local development if the Party Secretary and the chairman of local peo-
ple’s congress will be the same person), Hong wang 红网, 7 January 2016, http://ldhn.rednet.cn/c/
2016/01/07/3882405.htm (accessed 24 July 2018).
31. The rumour was already circulating in 2017 in Hong Kong.
32. Nectar Gan, “Scrapping Term Limits ‘has Wide Support’,” South China Morning Post, 6 March 2018,
A1.
33. Shi Jiangtao, “Report Tells How Move to Scrap Term Limit began,” South China Morning Post, 6
March 2018, A4.
34. Ibid.
35. A two-term limit is also imposed on the Chairman of the NPCSC, the President of the Supreme
People’s Court, and the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People’s Procuratoriate. See Articles 66,
120, and 130 of the 1982 Constitution.
36. Frank Ching, “China Charter Revision Shows HK Future Hangs by a Thread,” op. cit. 




41. For example, the US President has a two-term limit. The South Korean President has a one-term
limit.
42. German Chancellor Angela Merkel is now in her fourth term.
43. It was Deng Xiaoping’s view to have only the current two articles on the CMC. See Wang Hanbin
(2012). For detailed discussion of the inclusion of the CMC into 1982 Constitution, see Chen Sixi
陈斯喜 and Liu Songshan 刘松山 (2001: 3-6).
44. This was stated by Professor Xiao Weiyun in a lecture delivered at the City University of Hong Kong
many years ago. The official reason given by Professor Xiao in his book is that the CMC is different
from other constitutional organs at the national level because it needs to deal with emergencies
such as war. It is therefore better to have no term limit. See Xiao Weiyun 肖蔚云 (2004: 536). 
45. Jiang only gave up the position as Chairman of the CMC about two years after Hu became Pres-
ident of State.
Special feature
tion for this argument is that the President of State has mainly been a cer-
emonial title without much substantive authority. (46) This amendment
seems more of an alignment of the three positions and is unlikely to have
any substantial constitutional significance.
However, the fact that the President of State in China is not subject to
periodic evaluation by voters in genuine periodic general elections as in a
parliamentary system makes abolition of the term limit very undesirable.
Further, the abolition of term limits on the President of State together with
the emphasis on the leadership of the CCP will make life-long presidency
easier to achieve, and will move China further away from rule of law at the
constitutional level.
Creation of a new constitutional organ – supervisory
commissions
Discussion of the creation of supervision commissions started with the
proposal to reform the supervisory system in China in 2016 (Ma 2017).
A related legislative task is to enact the Supervision Law of the PRC (the
Supervision Law) (ibid.). The draft Supervision Law was only made avail-
able to the public in late 2017. (47) The Supervision Law was enacted by
the NPC during the same session as the 2018 constitutional amend-
ments. Long before the draft Supervision Law was made public, some
scholars who had been consulted by the central government in the draft-
ing process strongly criticised the draft Supervision Law (Qin 2017a; Qin
2017b; Tong 2016). The new supervisory commissions will combine cer-
tain functions formerly performed by the DICs of the CCP, the people’s
procuratorates, and the administrative supervision departments under
various people’s governments. Once created, they will be very powerful
constitutional organs. One main criticism raised by some scholars of the
reform as well as of the draft Supervision Law is that such powerful con-
stitutional organs should be subject to the supervision and control of the
organs of state power, i.e., the people’s congresses. In order to achieve
that objective, the Constitution should be amended (Tong 2016). It was
a surprise to those scholars that the 2018 constitutional amendments
addressed this concern.
As discussed above, at the national level, the NSC will be another consti-
tutional organ at the same level as the State Council, the Supreme People’s
Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the CMC. (48) The implication
is that state supervisory power will be regarded as a new kind of state power
comparable to the executive, military, judicial, and procuratorial powers
(Qin 2017a; Qin 2017b; Tong 2016).
Although neither the Constitution nor the Supervision Law provides a def-
inition of supervisory power, Article 1 of the Supervision Law provides that
its purposes are to (1) strengthen the supervision of all public officials ex-
ercising public power, (2) realise the full coverage of national supervision,
(3) conduct anti-corruption work in an in-depth manner, and (4) promote
the modernisation of the national governance system and governance ca-
pacity. (49) According to this provision, the two main objectives are supervi-
sion of public officials in their exercise of public power, and performance of
anti-corruption work. Article 11 of the Supervision Law has set out in detail
the exact scope of supervisory power. (50)
There are a few issues worthy of detailed analysis about this new consti-
tutional organ. The first is the nature of the supervisory commissions. When
China’s supervisory mechanism was re-established in the 1980s, adminis-
trative supervision was conducted by the Ministry of Supervision, while the
DICs of the CCP were in charge of supervising CCP members (Zhao 2010a:
166-70). In 1992, the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council
jointly decided to merge the DIC and administrative supervision organs at
the same level. On 7 January 1993, the Central Discipline and Inspection
Commission (CDIC) of the CCP and the Ministry of Supervision were
merged. Soon after, a similar merger was carried out at the local levels na-
tionwide (ibid.: 170-1).
At the national level, the NSC has been established and its first chairman
is Mr. Yang Xiaodu, one of eight deputy chairmen of the CDIC of the CCP. (51)
The Chairman of the CDIC is Mr. Zhao Leji, one of seven members of the
Standing Committee of the Politburo. (52)
Six out of the remaining seven vice chairmen of the CDIC are vice chair-
men of the NSC. (53) In addition, there are ten other members in the NSC,
of which nine are members of the Standing Committee of the CDIC, and
the last one is an ordinary member of the CDIC. (54) In total, the NSC has 17
members, whereas the CDIC has 133 members. (55) Although there is signif-
icant overlap of senior members between the CDIC and NSC, it is still pos-
sible to argue that the CDIC as a CCP organisation and the NSC as a
state/constitutional organ are separate. That may well be the intention of
the CCP for such an arrangement. (56)
At the operational level, the original Ministry of Supervision and the CDIC
consist of the same group of people wearing two different hats. Mr. Yang
Xiaodu, the Chairman of the NSC, was the Minister of Supervision. (57) With
the establishment of the NSC, the original anti-corruption unit within the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate has been merged into the NSC. The working
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46. According to articles 80 and 81 of the PRC Constitution, the President of the PRC promulgates statutes;
appoints and removes the Premier, Vice-Premiers, State Councillors, Ministers in charge of Ministries
or Commissions, and the Auditor-General and the Secretary-General of the State Council; confers state
medals and titles of honour; issues orders of special pardons; proclaims martial law; proclaims a state
of war; issues mobilisation orders; conducts state affairs; receives foreign diplomatic representatives
on behalf of the People’s Republic of China and, in pursuance of decisions of the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress, appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives abroad, and
ratifies and abrogates treaties and important agreements concluded with foreign states.  The only sub-
stantive authority among them is the authority to conduct state affairs, which was introduced by the
2004 constitutional amendments (the 28th Constitutional Amendment).
47. Its late publication for public consultation indicates the concern of the central government that
the draft law might be controversial, and that the government didn’t want the public to discuss
it for too long.
48. See Amendment 37 in the 2018 Constitutional Amendments.
49. See Article 1 of the Supervision Law of the PRC.
50. Article 11 of the Supervision Law of the PRC provides: “A supervisory commission shall, in accor-
dance with the provisions of this Law and relevant laws, perform the duties of supervision, inves-
tigation, and disposition: (1) It shall provide integrity education to public officials, and conduct the
supervision and inspection of public officials’ performance of functions in accordance with the law,
impartial exercise of power, clean administration, and moral integrity. (2) It shall conduct investi-
gations of duty-related violations of laws and crimes such as suspected corruption and bribery,
abuse of power, negligence of duty, power rent-seeking, tunnelling, the practice of favouritism and
falsification, as well as the waste of state assets. (3) It shall, in accordance with the law, make de-
cisions on disciplinary actions in respect of government affairs against public officials who violate
any law, hold liable the leaders who fail to perform their functions in an effective manner or neglect
their duties and responsibilities, transfer investigation results on suspected duty-related crimes to
the people’s procuratorates for examination and initiate a public prosecution in accordance with
the law, and offer supervisory suggestions to the entities where supervisory objects work.”
51. There are eight Vice-chairmen, and Mr. Yang is ranked number one out of them. See “领导结构”
(Lingdao jiegou, Leadership structure), http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/ldjg/ (accessed 30 April 2018).
52. The other members are Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Han Zheng, Wang Huning, Wang Yang, and Li Zhanshu. 
53. They are Liu Jinguo 刘金国, Yang Xiaochao 杨晓超, Li Shulei 李书磊, Xu Lingyi 徐令义, Xiao Pei
肖培, and Chen Xiaojiang 陈小江. See http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/ldjg/ (accessed 30 April 2018).
54. See http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/xxgk/ldjg/ (accessed 30 April 2018).
55. Ibid.
56. The advantage of doing so is to have clear separation of party organisations from constitutional
organisations.
57. After establishment of the NSC, Mr. Yang became its first Deputy-chairman.
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staff of the NSC and the CDIC are the same. (58) It is fair to say that the NSC
and the CDIC have become the same organisation wearing two different
hats, with the only differences being that a few senior leaders of the CDIC
are not senior leaders of the NSC, and that most ordinary members of the
CDIC are not members of the NSC. (59)
At the local levels, DICs of the CCP and administrative supervision depart-
ments of the people’s governments at the same levels already consisted of
the same group of personnel wearing two different hats. After the reform,
as at the national level, the anti-corruption units of local people’s procura-
torates have been merged into local supervisory commissions. Local super-
visory commissions and DICs at the same level have become the same
organisations wearing two different hats. Before the reform, the head of a
local supervisory department of a people’s government was usually a
deputy chairman of the local DIC at the same level. (60) After the reform, the
head of a local DIC concurrently holds the position of chairman of the su-
pervisory commission at the same level of government. (61)
The above discussion of the evolution of institutional arrangements reveals
that before the 2018 constitutional amendments, DICs were already part of
the executive branch of the people’s governments. Since the 2018 constitu-
tional amendments, the DICs continue to exist within the constitutional
structure. Their status has, however, been upgraded from an organ within the
executive branch to a constitutional organ with equal status to the people’s
government, the people’s court, and the people’s procuratorate. (62)
The second is the scope of supervision to be conducted by supervisory
commissions. Under the Administrative Supervision Law that has been abol-
ished by the Supervision Law, (63) the scope of supervision was limited to
“the administrative organs of the state and public servants thereof and other
persons appointed by administrative organs of the state.” (64) Now the Su-
pervision Law has expanded the scope comprehensively to include civil ser-
vants of all political parties and state organs, personnel of organisations and
entities managing public affairs, managers of state-owned enterprises, per-
sonnel engaged in management at basic-level self-governing mass organi-
sations, and personnel performing public duties according to law. (65) This
comprehensive supervision is supported by the statutory authorisation that
supervisory commissions may dispatch supervisory bodies and supervisors
to organs of the CCP, state organs, organisations and entities managing pub-
lic affairs, administrative regions, and state-owned enterprises under their
jurisdictions. (66)
This is a significant change. In addition to the original administrative su-
pervision, state supervision now also covers supervision of CCP organs and
their personnel, which used to be the function performed by the DICs of
the CCP. State supervision also covers supervision of other political parties,
organs of state power, state-owned enterprises, and autonomous mass or-
ganisations. In summary, all organisations and personnel involved in per-
forming public functions in their broad sense fall within the scope of
supervision by supervisory commissions. That is why Professor Tong Zhiwei
has observed that it is a change from administrative supervision to com-
prehensive supervision (Tong 2016).
The third is the legalisation of certain extra-legal compulsory measures
formerly taken by the DICs. One specific measure is “shuanggui” (双规),
meaning that a DIC will detain an official/Party member who is suspected
of corruption at a designated place and ask him to make a confession within
a designated period of time (Sapio 2008; Backer and Wang 2014). This has
been criticised by many scholars as an unlawful violation of the principle
of presumption of innocence and other fundamental rights (Sapio 2008;
Backer and Wang 2014). Now Article 22 of the Supervision Law has granted
supervisory commissions the authority to detain suspects of corruption
under certain circumstances. (67) The creation of the new constitutional
organ of supervisory commissions together with the above statutory au-
thorisation has not only legalised but also constitutionalised the formerly
unlawful “shuanggui.”
In summary, the 2018 constitutional amendments together with the Su-
pervision Law have achieved several results. First, they have converted the
CCP’s disciplinary organs into state supervisory organs. Second, they have
upgraded the status of the CCP’s disciplinary organs within the constitu-
tional structure from an organ of the executive branch to a constitutional
organ at the same level with the executive branch, the people’s courts, and
the people’s procuratorates. Third, the inclusion of all political parties within
the scope of supervision will strengthen the impression that all political par-
ties and their personnel are part and parcel of the governing structure in
China and the same as other constitutional organs. (68) These results have
changed the constitutional structure of China, the relationship between dif-
ferent state powers, and the Party-state relationship. 
The impact on two conceptual interpretative
frameworks
Unlike scholars embracing normative constitutional theory who opine that
China has a constitution but without constitutionalism (Zhang 2010a), some
scholars in both mainland China and overseas have, for more than a decade,
made efforts to put forward various conceptual interpretative frameworks to
explain and justify constitutional practice in China, especially the divergence
and conflicts between constitutional practice and the written Constitution
(Xie and Patapan 2016: 1002-14). For example, most rights provisions exist
on paper only, CCP organs operate outside the state legal system and exercise
leadership in all national affairs, and so on (Lin 2010). This part of the article
will examine two better-known theories of Chinese constitutionalism (Backer
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58. This information was provided by an official working in the CDIC.
59. Many other ordinary members of the CDIC are leaders of provincial DICs. The practice is for two
leaders from each provincial and ministerial DIC to be members of the CDIC.
60. The head of the local supervisory department within the people’s government is usually the no.
3 person within the local disciplinary commission below the Chairman and Vice-chairman in
charge of daily work. This information was obtained from two officials working in provincial and
municipal people’s governments in mainland China during the writing of this article.
61. This information was provided by local officials through my interviews.
62. In constitutional theory, the National Supervisory Commission is at the same level as the State
Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate.
63. See Article 69 of the Supervision Law of the PRC.
64. See Article 2 of the Administrative Supervision Law of the PRC.
65. See Article 15 of the Supervision Law of the PRC.
66. See Article 12 of the Supervision Law of the PRC.
67. Article 22 provides: “Where the person under investigation is suspected of corruption, bribery, ne-
glect of duty, malfeasance in office, or any other serious duty-related violation or duty-related
crime, and the supervisory organ has obtained facts and evidence on the violation or crime, but
needs to conduct further investigation of important issues, after examination and approval by
the supervisory organ in accordance with law, the person may be detained at a specific place
under any of the following circumstances: (1) The circumstances of the case in which the person
is involved are major or complicated. (2) The person may escape or commit suicide. (3) The person
may make a false confession in collusion or forge, conceal, or destroy evidence. (4) The person
may commit any other conduct that obstructs investigation. – The supervisory organ may, in ac-
cordance with the provision of the preceding paragraph, detain any person who is suspected of
giving bribes or committing any joint duty-related crime. The setup, management, and supervision
of detention places shall be governed by the relevant provisions of the state.”
68. The Civil Servants Law of the PRC classifies those working in the organisations of all political par-
ties as civil servants. See Articles 64 and 66 of the Civil Servants Law.
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2012; Chen 2008) and analyse whether they are capable of satisfactorily ex-
plaining the 2018 constitutional amendments, in particular the creation of
new supervisory organs that fuse the CCP and state apparatus. 
Political constitutional theory and its applicability
The theory
Some constitutional scholars started advocating political constitutional-
ism in China in 2008 (Chen 2008; Jiang 2010; Jiang 2014). Professor Chen
Duanhong from Peking University Law School was the very first of them
(Chen 2008). Other scholars joined him later, and Professor Jiang Shigong
has become better known overseas. (69) Despite their criticisms, they believe
that China has a constitutional system that has been functioning effectively
for the past four decades. (70) Further, the Chinese political system has been
a significant force in maintaining political order, keeping the country and
society integrated, and developing its economy rapidly. (71) While accepting
that some aspects of Chinese political practice would appear unconstitu-
tional in terms of the written Constitution, scholars of political constitu-
tional theory try to explain and justify such inconsistencies. 
Professor Chen defends the leadership of and the roles played by the CCP
by resorting to the theory of sovereignty. For him, the CCP is not bound by
the Constitution because it has sovereignty. It is the sovereign power to
make the Constitution (pouvoir constituant), and is not subject to any re-
straints. When exercised, that sovereign power creates constituted powers
(pouvoirs constitués) such as legislative, executive, and judicial powers.
Since the Preamble to the Constitution states that sovereignty resides in
the Chinese people, it is possible to regard the CCP and NPC as constituted
powers. For Professor Chen, the CCP as ultimate representative of the people
is sovereign (not pouvoirs constitués) and is therefore above the NPC. The
CCP is a standing organisation and exists alongside the Constitution, rather
than being bound by it. The CCP may exercise its sovereign power to take
measures that are not in line with the written Constitution. Consequently,
it makes little sense to regard those measures as unconstitutional, because
the Constitution is not intended to bind the CCP as the sovereign (Chen
2008; Xie and Patapan 2016: 1009-12).
Professor Jiang Shigong defends unconstitutional acts of the CCP through
an alternative interpretation of the constitution. For him, the written con-
stitution is only one aspect of a larger conception of the constitution, in
which there exists no inconsistency between political practice and the con-
stitution. He argues that in addition to the written constitution, there are
other rules and provisions that govern Chinese politics, and which constitute
an unwritten constitution or even the real constitution of China. According
to him, it is a mistake to take the written constitution as the only constitu-
tion. Rather, the constitution is composed of a range of rules and practices
that are influential in Chinese politics (Jiang 2010; Jiang 2014; Xie and Pat-
apan 2016: 1011). Some other commentators call these the “living” consti-
tution in China (He 2012). The constitution of the CCP is one type of
unwritten constitution in China. (72) The tripartite rule, the constitutional
thoughts of political leaders, and laws and statutes of a constitutional nature
are also important parts of the unwritten constitution in China (Jiang 2010). 
What Professor Chen and Professor Jiang have in common is that both
are of the view that the Constitution of the CCP constitutes valid and gen-
uine constitutional rules that are binding in China, although based on dif-
ferent jurisprudential justifications. 
Analysis of its applicability
How might each of them respond to the fusion of CCP and state organs
through the new supervisory commissions and their inclusion within the
Constitution? Chen might argue that it’s the CCP’s decision to carry out
this fusion and make the new supervisory commissions accountable to the
people’s congresses. Such acts undertaken by the CCP as sovereign are per-
fectly fine and acceptable. Moreover, the NPC has endorsed such fusion
through the 2018 constitutional amendments. As a result, the fusion is con-
stitutional. For Jiang, the fusion is not a problem either. Since the fusion is
already written into the Constitution, he doesn’t even need to resort to his
unwritten constitution theory to argue the constitutionality of the fusion.
In essence, because scholars of political constitutional theory give decisions
of the CCP a status either equivalent to or higher than the Constitution, and
because whatever is written into the Constitution will be constitutional, the
CCP’s decision to carry out this fusion and incorporate it into the Constitu-
tion is not only constitutional but also perfectly acceptable to them.
The inclusion of the leadership of the CCP into Article 1 of the Constitution
through the 2018 constitutional amendments suggests that the CCP is not
satisfied with the existence of its leadership only in the Preamble of the
Constitution and wants it to be part of its formal text. Two possible infer-
ences can be drawn. One is that the CCP wants its leadership to become a
formal constitutional principle in order to legitimise its actual leadership in
all national affairs. The other is that it may be problematic to rely on the
CCP constitution to govern the state and to treat the CCP constitution
above the state Constitution. As a result, the political constitution theory is
best regarded as a theory to justify Chinese constitutional practice that is
still in transition. (73)
The theory of a dual normative system and its
applicability
The theory
Although the term “dual normative system” was coined by Ling Li, the
substantive argument was raised a few years earlier by Larry Backer in 2012
(Backer 2012). Like Professor Chen, Backer opines that the Chinese consti-
tutional order is grounded on the distribution of popular sovereign power
between the CCP and the administrative apparatus of the state government,
privileging the political authority assigned to the CCP over the administra-
tive authority vested in the government (ibid.). According to him, the 1982
Constitution was grounded on two principles. The first is the separation of
the CCP apparatus from the state, critical to which is “the need to consol-
idate and institutionalise Party leadership in a system that leaves room for
a state apparatus” (ibid.: 368-9). The second is “to formalize the relationship
of apparatus – both State and Party – to law” (Backer 2012: 369), which
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scholar on political constitutional theory is Gao Quanxi (2012: 22-43).
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71. Ibid.
72. In addition, Jiang is of the view that constitutional conventions, thoughts of political leaders, and
constitutional statutes such as the Basic Law of Hong Kong are other types of unwritten consti-
tutions in China. See Jiang (2010), and also Xie Libin and Haig Patapan (2016: 1012).
73. This is actually the argument of Professor Gao Quanxi, who is another famous scholar advocating
this theory. See Gao (2012: 22-43).
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was “realized through the adoption of a constitutional framework for the
governance of state and Party” (ibid.: 370). Backer posits that “the principle
of constitutionalization in China might best be understood as bifurcated”
and “focused both on rule of law institutionalization of the state apparatus
combined with a similar institutionalization of Party organization through
its own constitution” (ibid.: 370). He suggests that it is important to under-
stand the Chinese constitutional system as being comprised of two docu-
ments – the 1982 Constitution and the constitution of the CCP. “The former
lays out the organization of the state and the relationship between the state
apparatus and the party in power, which remains the holder of supreme
collective political authority. (…) The latter organizes and institutionalizes
the manifestation of political authority within the nation” (ibid.: 370-1).
Backer believes that the state can only be considered complete when the
formal state apparatus is joined with the CCP apparatus under the rule of
law framework expressed in both the Chinese Constitution and the CCP
constitution (ibid.: 372). 
For Backer, the relationship between the state normative system and the
CCP normative system is hierarchical, with the state apparatus sitting at a
lower level while the CCP enjoys supreme political authority (ibid.: 385). He
argues that the Chinese model constitutes a unique constitutionalist state-
party in which the CCP as an institutionalised collective “has principal re-
sponsibility for constitutional values – for shaping the form and values
substance of the rule of law” (ibid.: 396).  For him, the CCP as the source of
thick rule of law is vested with that function through the Constitution. On
the one hand, the CCP is a state institution whose functional role is con-
strained by the Constitution. On the other, the CCP represents the political
power of the people of the state and therefore has an extra-constitutional
role (ibid.: 396). 
Like Backer, Li also believes the normative system of the CCP is separate
from the normative system of the state. In her view, the two normative sys-
tems could be compatible or complementary most of the time, since the
CCP sanctions state laws. If CCP interests diverge from state interests and
CCP regulations are at odds with state laws, the CCP normative system en-
joys superior authority (ibid. 2012). Li’s main contribution to the theory is
on how the normative system of the CCP is integrated with the normative
system of the state. For her, the CCP’s exercise of power, especially the de-
cision-making process, is separate from that of the state. Instead of a fusion
of the CCP and state activities, state decision-making has been bifurcated,
with one phase taking place backstage in CCP institutions and the other
taking place onstage in state institutions. The bridge between them is pro-
vided by the Party-groups installed in state institutions, which serve both
the CCP and the state (Li 2015: 106). In this way, while at the controlling
end of the decision-making process, CCP activities are isolated and con-
cealed from state activities. As a result, the CCP is shielded from being held
accountable for state actions that are taken on the CCP’s instructions (Li
2015: 106).
Analysis of its applicability
The theory of a dual normative system is a good attempt to interpret and
justify constitutional practice in China. By deeming the CCP constitution
an essential component of the constitutional normative system, this theory
legitimises the leadership of the CCP. It treats the CCP as a state institution
on top of the state apparatus. It also explains well the extra-
constitutional/legal role played by the CCP.
One challenge posed to this theory by the new constitutional amend-
ments, especially the supervisory commissions with fused functions in both
the CCP and state apparatus, is its claim of separation between the CCP
and state apparatus. Both Backer and Li hold the position that there is a di-
vision of power and matters between the CCP and the state under the 1982
Constitution and in Chinese constitutional practice thereafter. But the CCP
abandoned separation of the CCP from the state apparatus after 1989. The
creation of supervisory commissions represents a conflation of both the
CCP apparatus and the state apparatus. This trend has continued with the
2018 institutional reform plan, under which many other CCP and adminis-
trative organs have merged. (74) This fusion will deepen in the foreseeable
future and challenge the persuasiveness of this theory.
A related challenge is the theory’s position on the relationship of the de-
cision-making process between the CCP and the state, which suggests that
the CCP apparatus acts backstage whereas the state apparatus functions
onstage. This may well be the wish of many Chinese scholars, including my-
self (Lin 2011). If the CCP exercises its leadership through the Party groups,
as claimed by Li, that means the CCP is aware of the necessity to operate
under the Constitution. But since 1989, the CCP has never shied away from
making decisions directly without going through the state apparatus, espe-
cially the NPC and NPCSC. 
For example, the current round of judicial reform was initiated by the CCP. (75)
According to the new white paper on judicial reform, (76) the CCP Committee
on Deepening Reform held 19 meetings on judicial reform in 2014 and
2015. (77) The CCP is masterminding the current round of judicial reform. SPC
Opinions have been adopted to implement the policies decided by the CCP
Committee on Deepening Reform. (78) For the foreseeable future, therefore,
the leadership of the CCP is and will continue to be the propelling force for
judicial reform in China. The CCP will continue to make decisions onstage
rather than backstage. This practice demands adjustment of the theory.
The third challenge is whether the Chinese system of constitutionalism is
designed for the normative system of the CCP to function above the law,
including the Constitution. This is also the actual claim of political consti-
tutional theorists in China. (79) Only in so doing is it possible to justify the
existence of Chinese-style constitutionalism. Otherwise, any inconsistent
CCP policies and decisions need to directly face arguments of unconstitu-
tionality as claimed by democratic and normative constitutional theorists.
However, whether the CCP actually intends its normative system to be
above the Constitution is a questionable proposition. Taking the example of
the DICs’ authority and their coercive investigative power in fighting ram-
pant corruption, a consensus exists among scholars that this is extra-con-
stitutional/legal (Li 2015: 107). According to the theory of a dual normative
system, such extra-constitutional norms are above the Constitution and
therefore justifiable. However, the CCP has amended the Constitution by
bringing the DICs within the Constitution as supervisory commissions. Fur-
thermore, the CCP has enacted the Supervision Law to legalise this coercive
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78. Ibid.
79. See above discussion on political constitutional theory.
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investigative power. (80) This shows that the CCP is aware that its past prac-
tice was unlawful and unconstitutional. It has taken positive steps to make
those unconstitutional norms constitutional. (81)
One positive inference of the above actions is that the CCP doesn’t be-
lieve that CCP norms should be above the Constitution. However, it can
also be counter-argued that the CCP has directly put itself forward by co-
alescing the Party and state functions and apparatus. By constitutionalising
the CCP’s power and legalising those once extra-legal measures, the CCP
effectively operates above the law. This is indeed quite possible and may
represent the actual thinking of the CCP. However, the fact that the CCP
has made an effort to constitutionalise and legalise once extra-constitu-
tional/legal measures is evidence that it has at least taken the rule by law
approach. It has regarded the law as a tool to be used when it sees fit. For
me, such an instrumental approach towards the Constitution and legal
norms is better than completely ignoring inconsistency between CCP
norms and state norms and openly advocating the supremacy of incon-
sistent CCP norms above state norms. If an evolutionary approach is taken
toward the development of rule of law in China, the law is being taken very
much more seriously today than before (Peerenboom 2002: chapter 1-3).
Compared with the Mao period, the CCP’s consciousness of doing things
according to the law has increased considerably. My argument is that the
most immediate objective for the development of constitutionalism in
China is to ensure that all institutions and powers, including the CCP, are
subject to state law. What the CCP has done through the creation of su-
pervisory commissions is a step in the right direction. Once this is achieved,
the next step is for China to move to the thin rule of law by satisfying its
minimum threshold criteria (ibid.). The third stage will be the adoption of
some sort of thick rule of law. As Peerenboom has argued, the CCP is not
monolithic, and there is support for rule of law among senior officials as
well as rank-and-file members. The CCP’s decisions on whether or not to
move toward rule of law are constrained by various factors such as the
need to sustain economic growth and attract foreign investment, interna-
tional pressure, discontent over corruption, as well as the rising domestic
demand for rule of law (ibid.). The legalisation of extra-legal measures
through the Supervision Law and making the supervisory commissions ac-
countable to the people’s congresses result primarily from rising domestic
demand for rule of law. (82)
In summary, these three challenges cast doubt on the applicability of this
theory.
The way forward – adjustment of the existing
theories or a new theory?
The political constitutional theory acknowledges the political reality in
China and treats the leadership of the CCP and its norms as either above the
Constitution or as an integral part of its constitutional system. As a result,
whatever has been decided by the CCP will be constitutional according to
this theory. Since the actual effect of this theory is to blindly endorse any
decisions taken by the CCP, it is not really appealing to those who would like
to see the Chinese constitutional system develop in a way that satisfies at
least the minimum criteria of the thin rule of law theory. Even Professor Jiang
himself realises the necessity of maintaining a critical attitude towards Chi-
nese constitutional problems and has suggested amendments to the Con-
stitution that include rules about the transfer of power and that put the CCP
under the supervision of the Constitution (Jiang 2010: 41-2). While acknowl-
edging the usefulness of this theory in justifying China’s constitutional prac-
tice, it is also its main weakness, as no pressure exists under this theory to
make China move towards even thin rule of law. The best approach is to treat
this theory as one with value for present-day China, which is still in transition
from rule by law to thin rule of law. Once China moves beyond the rule by
law stage, this theory will lose its value and should be abandoned.
The theory of a dual normative system seems better and more sophisticated
as it not only attempts to justify the leadership of the CCP within the Chinese
constitutional system but also explains the interaction between state legal
norms and CCP norms. However, as analysed above, this theory also faces se-
rious challenges raised by the 2018 constitutional amendments. Dualism,
which is the core of this theory, is in direct conflict with the intention behind
the 2018 constitutional amendments, i.e., more fusion of the CCP with the
state. The continuing effort to integrate CCP and state organs through the
2018 institutional reform makes this theory less and less convincing. 
There seem to be two ways forward. The first is to go back to normative
constitutional theory by adopting an evolutionary approach to the devel-
opment of constitutionalism in China. As discussed above, the 2018 con-
stitutional amendments prove that China is still at the rule by law stage
and may gradually develop into a thin rule of law stage. But this approach
won’t appeal to political constitutional theorists. The second approach is to
develop a new constitutional theory that can better explain the 2018 con-
stitutional amendments and the subsequent trend of fusion. Developing
such a theory is beyond the scope of this article, besides which the author
is not a political constitutional theorist.
Conclusion
This article has discussed two main issues relating to the 2018 constitu-
tional amendments; one is their significance, and the other is their impact
upon two existing interpretative theories of the constitutional reality in
China. With regard to the first issue, this article has argued that although
abolition of term limits on the President of State and incorporation of the
CCP leadership into Article 1 of the Constitution have attracted wide at-
tention and criticism, the two controversial amendments will not cause
much practical change to the constitutional structure or its operation in
China. Accordingly, they are of neither theoretical nor practical constitu-
tional significance. The creation of the new constitutional organ of super-
visory commissions merges another set of CCP organs with state organs
and constitutionalises the functions performed by the DICs. This constitu-
tional amendment is likely to cause significant change to both the consti-
tutional structure and its operation in China. This amendment also raises
new constitutional issues such as the nature of the supervisory power, the
relationship between supervisory commissions and other state organs, and
the future Party-state relationship.
However, these three constitutional amendments have sent out a bad
signal. In addition, since there is lack of periodic evaluation of the President
of State through genuine general elections, the abolition of the term limit
together with the emphasis on the CCP’s leadership and merging more
Party and state organs will facilitate making life-long presidency a reality
N o . 2 0 1 9 / 1  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 19
80. See Article 22 of the Supervision Law.
81. The CCP has taken a formalistic approach towards rule of law on this issue.
82. The draft Supervision Law contained no provisions to make supervisory organs accountable to
the people’s congresses. Because of strong domestic criticism and demand, such provisions were
eventually incorporated into the Supervision Law.
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and move China further away from rule of law at the constitutional level.
With regard to the second issue, this article has discussed the political con-
stitution theory and the theory of a dual normative system. The above anal-
ysis shows that the political constitution theory can still explain the
constitutional reality. However, this theory gives a blind endorsement to any
decisions taken by the CCP. The adoption of this theory serves no purpose
other than to legitimise the leadership of the CCP. Since an increasing number
of people in China – not only scholars, but also millions of people who have
been trained to believe in rule of law, as well as the rising middle class – ex-
pect China to gradually embrace rule of law, the author of this paper argues
that this theory has historical limitations and is only suitable for present-
day China, which is still in its transition from rule by law to rule of law. 
The theory of a dual normative system has been a good attempt to justify
and interpret the constitutional reality in China. It has legitimised the leadership
exercised by the CCP and adequately explains the extra-constitutional role
played by the CCP. But the creation of the new constitutional organ of super-
visory commissions challenges some core assumptions of this theory, such as
the separation of the CCP apparatus from the state apparatus, the separation
of CCP matters from state matters, and the intention for the normative system
of the CCP to function above the state normative system. Since dualism is the
core of this theory, and the 2018 constitutional amendments and subsequent
trend of fusion make this theory less and less persuasive. 
The Party-state relationship in China has moved one step closer to a con-
stitutionalised fused system, rather than to a dual normative system. The
new constitutionalised fused system differs from the old fused system be-
fore the CCP came to power in China in that the fused power is subject to
the state constitutional and legal system. This article argues that this new
fused system challenges theorists of Chinese constitutionalism to come up
with a new theory that can better explain new constitutional developments
in China. Any new theory should serve not only the purpose of justifying
constitutional practice in China but also the purpose of pushing China to-
wards at least the thin rule of law. 
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